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I. Introduction
While pensions are believed to be critical for protecting material well-being after retirement, only 20 percent of seniors worldwide receive pension benefits (Pallares-Miralles, Romero and Whitehouse, 2012) . For those who have coverage, the benefits are often inadequate (ILO, 2014; Gasparini et al., 2007) . Additionally, poverty rates among the elderly are substantially higher in countries where social security coverage is limited; the number of people who are 60 years of age or older is estimated to double by 2050 (United Nations, 2013) ; and the life expectancy of the elderly is also estimated to substantially increase by 2050 (Bosch, Melguizo and Pagés 2013) .
For these reasons, improving the effectiveness of pensions and expanding pension programs compel immediate attention.
A number of governments have responded to high poverty rates among the elderly with noncontributory pensions. In OECD countries, 59 percent of the income of individuals over age 65
comes from public pension transfers (OECD, 2015) . In Latin America, at least 15 countries have implemented non-contributory pension programs covering about 20 percent of the region's population (Bosch, Melguizo and Pagés, 2013; Pallares-Miralles, Romero and Whitehouse, 2012) .
In Latin America, these programs constitute a large part of social safety nets. For example, in Mexico, the Adultos Mayores program is the second largest social program behind the conditional cash transfer program Progresa (formerly Oportunidades), and in Peru, Pension 65, a noncontributory pension program for the elderly, is second only to the conditional cash transfer
program Juntos (Rubio and Garfias, 2010; Aguila et al., 2013 , MIDIS, 2012 .
In this paper, we explore the effects of Pension 65 in Peru. The program's main goal is to provide economic security to persons who are 65 years of age or older and living in poverty (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, 2011) . At the time this study was conducted, the program provided beneficiaries with US$ 78 every two months. This study makes use of a strong identification strategy by exploiting an exogenous poverty cutoff to determine eligibility. As a result, we are able to analyze household survey data using a sharp regression discontinuity approach. We estimated effects for a sample of households that is within 0.3 standard deviations of the threshold. As a result, program participation was statistically ignorable in the neighborhood that we studied.
We find that households with a beneficiary increased their level of consumption by 40 percent and that the program reduced the proportion of older adults doing paid work by 4 percentage points. These effects contributed to their subjective welfare as indicated by a 9-percentage-point reduction in the Geriatric Depression Scale. However, we do not find impacts on the use of health services, physical health outcomes, enrollment of minors in school or household composition.
However, we find that transfers to persons residing outside the household increased as the proportion of households that reported expenditures on transfers rose from 46 percent to 61 percent.
Several studies have focused on the effects of non-contributory pension schemes on the health and material welfare of beneficiaries. Some examine the effects of such schemes on consumption (Fan, 2010; Blau, 2008; Case and Deaton, 1998) , physical health (Kadir and Barret, 2014) , and labor supply (de Carvalho, 2008; Bosch, Melguizo and Pagés, 2013; Grueber and Wise, 1998) . Other studies have analyzed the effects of pensions on other family members. For example, Case and Deaton (1998) , Duflo (2003) , Hamoudi and Thomas (2014) and Fan (2010) explore program effects on children's school enrollment, household composition and private transfers. Our work is also related to the work of Finkelstein et al. (2012) and Baicker et al. (2013) who find access to Medicaid health insurance lowered self-reported depression in low-income adults. Indeed, the literature shows unemployment results in more depression because of the lack of work, but also in less depression as people can spend more time in pleasant activities (Knabe et al., 2010; Krueger and Muller, 2012; and Ruhm, 2001 ).
In contrast, in previous work, we took a comprehensive approach in examining the influence of Mexico's non-contributory pension schemes of Adultos Mayores on both material and subjective well-being (Galiani, Gertler and Bando, 2016) . Indeed, pensions may allow older adults to reduce their time working and increase their time enjoying life. We found that beneficiaries used part of the transfer to finance an increase in household consumption and used the rest to offset reduction in labor earnings from beneficiaries reducing paid work. These changes resulted in an improvement in mental health as measured by the Geriatric Depression Scale. 1
When we compare the results in this paper with the effects of the Adultos Mayores program in Mexico, we find that we can broadly generalize the estimates for Mexico to Peru. We find that the effects of the programs are not that different across the two countries. The depression score in Peru decreased by 8.68 percent, while it decreased in Mexico by 9.11 percent. Paid work decreased by 4 percentage points in both countries. In addition, consumption rose by 40 percent in Peru and by 14 percent in Mexico. For food consumption, households in Peru allocated 67 percent of the increase, while in Mexico, they allocated 54 percent.
This study is important in that it constructs external validity of the effects of non-contributory pensions, since in principle, the effects of any program are contingent on the context of the study (Angrist, J., 2004; Campbell, 1969; Fisher, 1935) . Understanding program effects in multiple 4 economic and cultural contexts is necessary in order to construct external validity and inform policy. A number of studies use similar multi-country strategies to generalize cause-and-effect constructs. For example, Cruces and Galiani (2007) examine the effects of fertility on labor outcomes in three counties, Banerjee et al. (2015) study microcredit in six countries, Gertler et al. (2015) study health promotion in four countries, Dupas et al. (2016) examine the effects of opening savings accounts in 3 countries, and investigate slum upgrading in three countries,.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the Pension 65 program. Section III describes the data, and section IV describes the identification strategy. Section V presents the empirical results. Section VI compares our findings with the results obtained in Mexico. Section VII concludes.
II. The Pension 65 Non-Contributory Pension Program
The program provides beneficiaries with a pension of US$ 39 per month, which is paid out in bi- 
III. Data Sources
The data used in this study come from two surveys carried out by the National Institute of There were two rounds of data collection. The first round was conducted in November and
December of 2012, and the second round, in the period from July to October of 2015. In the first round, data were collected on 4,031 individuals in 3,031 households. INEI excluded 58
households that had errors in their eligibility score in the SISFOH system from the second round.
Of the 2,973 remaining households, 234 were not found and therefore lost to attrition. We further excluded another 155 households from the analysis whose SISFOH scores at baseline were more than .3 standard deviations from the eligibility cutoff. Excluding these observations allows us to reduce the average distance of the SISFOH score from the eligibility threshold by 52 percent. 5 All in all, excluding all of these households did not likely affect our results as treatment status is uncorrelated with exclusion status (p-value = 0.559), and the baseline characteristics of the excluded households are not statistically different from those included in the sample (Table   A1 in Appendix A). In summary, the analysis sample used in this study consists of 3,342 individuals living in 2,584 households.
The survey questions were designed to collect detailed information on the older adults and their households, as well as basic information on all other household members. More specifically, the survey collected labor information for persons 14 years of age or older. This information included labor market participation, hours worked and monetary compensation. Anthropometric 3 Amazonas, Ancash, Cajamarca, Cusco, Hunuco, Junin, La Libertad, the provinces of the Lima Region (Cajatambo, Canta, Huarochiri, Oyón and Yauyos), Loreto, Pasco, Piura and Puno. 4 For a detailed description of the selection of the sample, see the Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion (MIDIS y MEF, 2013) . The INEI monitored actual transfers from January 2012 to June 2015, and the data can therefore be used to check for actual transfer reception. 5 The score distance from the eligibility threshold in the final sample is between -0.32 and 0.31. If we were to include the 155 observations that were located in the tail of the distribution, the score would take on values of between -0.46 and 0.86.
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measurements for the older adults in the sample (hypertension, waist circumference and body mass index (BMI)) were also taken. In addition, the survey included a series of questions designed to assess the cognitive health of these older adults. We then used these data to build a health status index based on a weighted average of standardized indicators. Standardization is relative to the distribution in the control group for the corresponding year.
The survey also collected data on perceptions about life related to the well-being of older adults, including life satisfaction, empowerment, contribution to household expenditures and self worth.
We summarize the information on these indicators in an index. The method used for the construction of this index was analogous to the one used to construct the health index summary indicator. 
IV. Identification Strategy
To identify the impact of the program on the outcomes of interest, we rely on a regression discontinuity design (RD) approach with SISFOH score as the running variable. Since the thresholds vary across the 15 conglomerates in the sample, we estimate the RD model also conditioning on conglomerate fixed effects. Specifically, we estimate the following empirical model:
where is the outcome for individual i living in conglomerate c, denotes treatment status and varies at the household level, denotes the distance from the conglomerate threshold, and denotes an error term. The term denotes a conglomerate fixed effect. We cluster errors at the conglomerate level.
Note that we control for distance from the threshold using a linear specification rather than polynomials because we restricted our survey sample to being very close to the thresholds. We provide evidence supporting the validity of this model specification in the baseline balance section below.
It is important to note that households could not manipulate the SISFOH score as the data used to estimate the SISFOH score were collected before Pension 65 had established the eligibility threshold. While compliance with treatment assignment was high, it was not perfect. After implementation, monitoring data revealed that 260 individuals who were receiving transfers were not eligible; 20 individuals in the control group were also receiving transfers; and 177 eligible individuals never received a transfer. Thus, our estimates are interpreted as intention-to-treat effects.
V. Descriptive Statistics and Baseline Balance
In this section, we provide descriptive statistics of the study population and investigate baseline balance in the context of our estimation strategy. Table 1 reports the baseline means of individual characteristics for the control group and differences in the baseline means of the treatment and control groups. Table 2 reports the same for household characteristics. In both tables, column (1) reports the baseline means for the control group; column (2) reports the difference of the treatment and control group baseline means; and column (3) reports the standard error of the difference in (2). Columns (4), (5) and (6) expenditures. In addition, the support that these older adults feel that they provide to the household results in a self-worth score of 0.60 on a scale from 0 to 1.
Column (1) of Table 2 shows that the average household has three individuals. The average age of the head of household is 68 years; 66 percent of the heads of household are married, and 75 percent are male. The average education level is 7.5 years (equivalent to a completed elementary education). The average level of labor income and of household expenditure per adult equivalent are both equal to US$ 51, which indicates that many of these households are indeed poor, have elderly members and obtain resources for expenditure on consumption from sources other than the formal labor market.
Overall, there are no statistically significant differences between the treatment and control groups for RD with conglomerate fixed effects (Column 4), our preferred model, that are consistent with the assumption behind our identification strategy. However, the simple RD (column 5) is next best with 4 out of 31 characteristics being statistically different at conventional levels of significance.
Finally, as expected, the simple difference in means (column 6) produces the most violations of baseline balance with 10 out of 31 characteristics being significantly different.
V. Empirical Results
In this section we present estimates of the impact of non-contributory pensions on labor supply, health, well being and consumption. We start out by discussing our preferred specification. More specifically, we focus on the intention-to-treat estimates arrived at using the RD model with conglomerate fixed effects. We then discuss how our results vary under alternative specifications in the previous to last subsection. Table 3 reports the results for labor market participation. Column (2) shows estimation without controls. Column (3) shows results with controls. Column (4) shows p-values adjusted for the family-wise error rate from multiple hypothesis testing following the procedure presented in Anderson (2008) . The adjusted p-values control for the probability of false rejection for the family of outcomes listed in each table. Anderson (2008) for the family of outcomes listed in the table. Consistent with this, older adults did not feel that their health had improved or that they were having less difficulty than before in performing daily activities. The physical health scores confirm this. Table 4 Panel B, which focuses on subjective well being, shows a different story. The program reduced the older adults' score on the Geriatric Depression Scale by 8.68 percent (from 0.43 to 0.39). In addition, the contribution-to-household expenditures score increased by 12.92 percent (from 0.83 to 0.94), and the self-worth score rose by 6.54 percent (from 0.57 to 0.61). However, the program did not affect the satisfaction score, which remained at 0.74, or the empowerment score, which remained at 0.88. The overall well-being score, shown in the last row of Panel B,
a. Labor Supply
b. Health and Well-Being
indicates that the program led to an increase in well-being equivalent to 0.17 standard deviations.
As the program made beneficiaries eligible for the public Integral Health Insurance Program (Seguro Integral de Salud (SIS)), we find that the share of older adults affiliated with this insurance program increased by 12 percent (from 79 percent to 89 percent). However, we find no effects on the use of health services. Table 5 reports estimates of program effects on health perception, insurance and health services. Anderson (2008) for the family of outcomes listed in the table. Anderson (2008) .
c. Household Income and Consumption
To get a sense of how these changes relate to the pension transfers, consider the following. The program transferred US$ 39 (125 Peruvian Soles (S$)) per month per person. Considering that the average household size is 2.84, and additionally that, on average, the sample includes 1.29 older adults per household. Therefore, the average transfer per adult equivalent to each household was US$ 39*1.29/2.84 = US$ 17.71. This amount is not statistically different from the increase in consumption (p=0.948). Consistent with this, we find household consumption changes in line with the total transfer. In other words, households with two older adults increase consumption twice as much as households with one older adult. Appendix C shows estimates by the number of older adults in the household. Anderson (2008) for the family of outcomes listed in the table.
d. Benefits to Other Family Members and Transfers
Increases in household consumption may benefit other household members, in addition to the older adults. Thus, we seek to determine if pension transfers affected school enrollment, where we define enrollment as the percentage of household members who are 3 to 15 years old and enrolled in an educational institution. Table 7 in Panel A shows the results of this analysis. No effects were found.
We then look at whether pensions influence living arrangements. As may be seen from the same panel, we do not find any effects on household size. Next, we try to determine if transfers at the older-adult and/or household-level change. Panel B shows impact estimates for current transfers at the household level. The share of households with individuals who reported having received a transfer in the previous six months decreases from 51 percent to 43 percent. However, column (4) shows this effect is not statistically significant when adjusting for multiple testing. We find no impact when transfers to older adults are excluded. We also find the share of private transfers sent increased from 46 to 62 percent.
We therefore conclude that the receipt of non-contributory pensions did not affect children's school enrollment or household composition. These results differ from those of Duflo (2003) and Hamoudi and Thomas (2014) , who find that the receipt of pensions did influence these two variables. We do not find evidence that the receipt of these pensions leads to a decrease in transfers either. Our results for this variable therefore differ from those of Fan (2010) , who finds that pension transfers translate into decreases in private transfers to the elderly equivalent to 39 cents for every pension dollar. In contrast, the receipt of a pension is likely to benefit family members who reside elsewhere.
d. Robustness Tests
In this section, we discuss the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications. In summary, our findings are robust. First, we compare the results just discussed with those obtained with the inclusion of controls. In the empirical section, we also report estimates while also conditioning on a set of observable control variables. Nevertheless, we expect local estimation to replicate the conditions of a local experiment. If so, the introduction of controls should not affect our point estimates previously reported. However, their introduction may increase the efficiency of the estimator of the parameter of interest. in Tables 3 to 7 . We find that, for all variables in Tables 3 through 7, the estimates are both similar in magnitude and statistical significance. This evidence is consistent with the assumption that eligibility thresholds successfully provide local exogenous variation in treatment assignment.
Next, we use monitoring information to incorporate differences between planned and actual treatment. We estimate program effects excluding the 260 non-eligible households that were identified ex-post. We also estimate local average treatment effects using eligibility as an instrument for the receipt of transfers. We find that these alternative specifications yield estimates that do not differ from our intent-to-treat estimates in our preferred specification. However, instrumental variable estimates are less efficient than ordinary least squares. We conclude that our average local treatment effects are within the margin of error of the intent-to-treat estimates.
Tables that compare these estimates with our intent-to-treat estimates may be found in Appendix D. We conclude our results are robust to alternative specifications.
VI. Generalizing the Results
In this section, we compare our findings with those of Galiani, Gertler and Bando (2016). The
Pension 65 program in Peru and the Adultos Mayores program in Mexico have three main features in common. First, both are federal programs intended to provide social security coverage to the elderly in poor areas. Second, both programs provide bi-monthly transfers of similar amounts (at the time these studies were conducted, the bi-monthly transfer in Mexico was equivalent to US$ 95, while it was equivalent to US$ 78 in Peru). Third, both programs have minimum eligibility requirements, since they both target persons above a set age threshold who are living in poverty.
However, the two programs differ in two important ways as well. Mexican study were larger, and the education level of the older adults was lower than in the Peruvian sample population. Another difference was that 59 percent of older adults work in Peru, while the corresponding figure was 36 percent in Mexico. Because of these differences, the labor impact of non-contributory pension systems is similar in magnitude in the two countries but is smaller as a percentage of initial outcomes in Peru than it is in Mexico.
The two surveyed populations are similar in terms of the age and gender of older adults, as well as household consumption levels. However, there are some significant differences between the two populations that need to be identified, as they allow us to learn how the effects of noncontributory pensions vary in different contexts. We identify two main differences. In addition, the household size in terms of adult equivalents is larger in Mexico, where an average household has 5.6 adult equivalents, while a household in Peru has 3.2. In addition, the average older adult in Peru has almost eight years of education, while the average older adult in Mexico has only two. These differences may, in part, be a result of the difference in targeting criteria, since the Adultos Mayores program in Mexico targets rural populations, while Pension 65 in Peru does not.
We conclude that the results for Peru contribute to our knowledge about the effects of noncontributory pensions and allow us to apply that knowledge to a different context. The evidence suggests that the findings of Galiani, Gertler and Bando (2016) in rural Mexico can be reasonably well generalized to Peru in qualitative terms and, in many cases, in quantitative terms as well.
VII. Conclusions.
In order to study the effects of non-contributory pensions in Peru, we exploit a regression discontinuity design around the poverty score threshold for eligibility. Since we focus on a sample of households within 0.3 standard deviations from the threshold, this study provides a stronger identification strategy than that of previous studies.
We find that the receipt of non-contributory pensions in Peru benefited older adults in several ways. For instance, it led to improvements in mental health, as evidenced by a reduction of nine percentage points in the overall Geriatric Depression Scale score. We do not find impacts on the use of health services or health, but the receipt of those pensions did decrease the amount of paid work performed by older adults by 4 percentage points. The bulk of the cash transfer was used to finance an increase in consumption of 40 percent. In addition, recipient households are more likely to support members who reside elsewhere, as the share of households that made transfers to other individuals or households increased from 46 percent to 61 percent. More importantly, we find that our results are qualitatively similar to those of Galiani, Gertler and Bando (2016) in Mexico and hence both sets of results help us to construct external validity.
Our findings should be viewed in the light of a number of caveats that point to directions for future research. First, we have observed these program effects after only one year, at most, since beneficiaries started receiving these program transfer payments, and it is possible that households may adjust their behavior in the long run. For example, Zhu and Xiaobo (2015) find that retirement leads to an immediate increase in life satisfaction, but they also find that the level of satisfaction decreases with time (see also Galiani, Gertler and Undurraga, 2016) . A second caveat is that the data do not allow us to study how the receipt of non-contributory pensions may affect persons of working age near retirement age. Galiani, Gertler and Bando (2016) , however, do not find anticipation effects in Mexico.
The number of people in need of non-contributory pensions is likely to increase significantly in the coming years, and government expenditure on non-contributory pension schemes will probably climb. The findings of this study suggest that public expenditure on such pension systems results in welfare improvements among beneficiaries. Moreover, these pensions benefit not only older adults but also other household members. Therefore, non-contributory pensions appear to be an effective means of enhancing welfare among the older population and of reducing poverty.
Appendices Appendix A. Comparison of households included and those excluded from analysis
In Table A1 of this appendix, we show a comparison of households included in and excluded from the analysis. The share of households excluded from the analysis amounts to 14 percent of the sample. Columns (A) and (B) give the means for each group. The different rows in the table indicate the factors used in the comparison. We include household-level outcomes, such as labor income and expenditure. In addition, we include treatment status, distance from the threshold value and household head characteristics. Column (C) shows differences and column (D) shows p-values for a test of equality in means. We find that the excluded households do not differ from included households in most areas. We do, however, find differences in distance from the threshold value with households that have been excluded from the analysis having lower SISFOH scores, which indicates that more of the poorer households have been excluded from the study. We also find differences in the marriage status of the head of household. However, these differences are not likely to bias our results. Indeed, our results hold true even when controls for these dimensions are included. 
Memory
Older adults were asked to perform five tasks: state the date, repeat three words, follow a three-step instruction, repeat the three words and copy the drawing (two intersecting circles). The score is the number of total tasks performed correctly over five. The survey respondents were requested to perform these tasks only in the 2015 round of data collection.
Physical health Average of standardized hypertension, waist circumference, BMI and memory indicators. We standardized each indicator according to the distribution in the control group for the corresponding year. All indicators had equal weights. Perception of good or very good health (1 if yes, 0 otherwise) Older adults' assessment of their health at the present time when given the options of very good, good, bad or very bad. Equals 1 if the response is very good or good. Equals 0 otherwise. Perception of difficulty with daily activities Older adults reporting difficulty with at least one of the following: walking from room to room, eating, bathing or showering, using the toilet, getting in or out of bed, or dressing. Variable equals 1 if yes and 0 if no. The score is the sum of the points for each question, divided by five.
Continued
Well-being The average of standardized scores for satisfaction, empowerment, contribution and self-worth. We standardized each indicator according to the distribution in the control group for the corresponding year. All indicators had equal weights. Continued Receipt of economic assistance in the previous six months by members of the social network of the older adult.
Social network transfer provision (US$)
Transfer of economic assistance in the previous six months to members of the social network of the older adult. Tables 3, 4 and 5. The second column shows estimates for the same model as in Column (1) but focuses on the 2,148 eligible households and 2,772 eligible individuals. The third column shows estimates for the same sample as the second column, but uses SISFOH score eligibility as an instrument for actual treatment. In summary, Columns (1) and (2) show intention-to-treat estimates and Column (3) shows local average treatment effects. Column (1) is based on the full sample, and Columns (2) and (3) are based on households whose treatment status was verified with monitoring data. Table D2 shows estimates of pension transfer effects on individual labor supply. Table D3 shows estimates of pension effects on health and well-being. Table D4 shows effects on household income and expenditure. In all three tables, the results do not differ to a statistically significant extent across models. Differences are larger for labor income in Table D2 between the RD model with controls (Column 1) and the local average treatment effect (Column 3). The average labor income in the control group for the full sample is US$ 22.93. Thus, the effect of these pensions varies from a reduction of 25 percent to a decrease of 56 percent in labor income. However, these two results do not differ to a statistically significant extent at the 10 percent level. As expected, local average treatment effects are larger than intention-to-treat estimates but are estimated less efficiently.
We conclude that any errors related to eligibility classification are unlikely to explain differences between treatment and control groups. In addition, average local effects are larger and are consistent with intent-to-treat effects. (1.76)*** (2.62)*** (4.46)*** Source: Authors' calculations. Note: Estimates for Column (1) are based on 3,342 observations. Estimates for Columns (2) and (3) are based on 2,772 observations. Standard errors, clustered at the conglomerate level, are shown in parentheses. Coefficients as percentages of the mean in the control group are shown in brackets. Controls include each individual's age, sex, marital status and years of schooling. 
